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INTRODUCTION
In 2002 János Kornai and I collaborated on a project at Collegium Budapest to 
study “Honesty and Trust: Theory and Experience in the Light of Post-Socialist 
Transformation”.1 Today, one might organize a follow-up project titled “Dishon-
esty and Distrust: Challenges to Democracy in Europe and the United States”. 
Our project focused on the process of rapid change in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. That process produced certain pathologies resulting from 
the weakness of democratic and social institutions and the speed of the transition. 
Dysfunctional practices risked building on dysfunctional practices in a vicious 
cycle. The early libertarian triumphalists, who believed that it was enough to in-
troduce electoral democracy and the free market in Eastern Europe, were facing 
the complex reality of “rebuilding the ship at sea” (Elster et al. 1998). My partici-
pation in the Budapest project built on my long-standing research on corruption 
that highlights the risks of weak institutions and unstable rules (Rose- Ackerman 
1978, 1999).2 That work complemented Kornai’s early critiques of the socialist 
economic system. He pointed out its contradictions, in practice, even as he ap-
plauded the goal of a fair system of economic production and distribution (Kornai 
1980, 1986). We shared the hope of a transition toward liberal democracy and 
a regulatory, social-welfare state in Eastern Europe that could produce widely 
shared prosperity and limit poverty.
The workshops at Collegium Budapest and the two volumes that we edited 
were both a warning about the problematic aspects of the transition and an ex-
pression of hope for a more inclusive and fair way forward in Eastern Europe. 
Unfortunately, our worries have proved prescient. Hungary has moved in the 
direction of ever more consolidated one-party rule, and Poland shows similar 
trends, in spite of its more powerful institutional checks. With both countries now 
inside the European Union, the options for the EU are limited, especially given 
its preoccupation with managing the voluntary exit of the United Kingdom. Fur-
thermore, especially distressing for those who value both democratic legitimacy 
and technocratic competence, the United States may be moving away from both. 
The issues that we studied in 2002 remain salient and have a broader application 
than we imagined at that time.
1 The project produced two books: Kornai – Rose-Ackerman (2004) and Kornai et al. (2004). 
2 See also Rose-Ackerman – Palifka (2016), the second edition of Rose-Ackerman (1999).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW “REFORM” IN THE UNITED STATES
Just as a number of European legal systems and public law scholars are beginning 
to accept the democratic legitimacy of public participation in executive rulemak-
ing and to consider a role for judicial oversight,3 the Trump Administration and 
Congressional Republicans want to repudiate many past regulatory accomplish-
ments and to undermine the basic principles of the US Administrative Procedure 
Act [APA]. In the first instance, President Trump and his appointees are using 
executive action to cut back the regulatory welfare state.4 Proposals before the US 
Congress would have a more long-term impact if enacted into law.5 Notice and 
comment rulemaking under the APA presently requires public notice of proposed 
rules (that is, secondary norms), open-ended participation in hearings, followed 
by reasoned justification of publicly issued rules. Judicial review concentrates 
on procedural irregularities and on the consistency of executive norms with un-
derlying statutory authority. These procedures seek to balance public input with 
technical competence in executive branch policymaking; actual practice reflects 
that balance, however imperfectly.
Proposed amendments to the APA now before the Congress would move 
agencies toward heavily judicialized procedures that misunderstand the nature 
of executive branch policymaking or, more cynically, seek to stymie regulatory 
activities. The proposed statutes would remake the statutory basis of the US ad-
ministrative state by delivering deregulation to aggrieved economic sectors at the 
expense not only of lower substantive benefits for the public, but also of weaker 
state capacity to carry out any kind of democratically legitimate policymaking 
inside the executive and the independent agencies. The purported “reforms” now 
before the Congress would shift agencies toward a more formal judicialized proc-
ess that casts rulemaking as an adversarial exercise, not an effort to seek a reason-
able policy outcome that balances interests, principled claims, and facts. 
3  See for example, Hoffmann – Schneider (2017) (discussing the ReNUAL initiative, which 
includes proposals for the reform of the EU’s rulemaking procedures to involve more public 
input).
4  Executive Order 13777 [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/24/presiden-
tial-executive-order-enforcing-regulatory-reform-agenda (accessed August 2, 2017)] (in-
structing agencies to submit plans to repeal, replace, and modify existing regulations “to make 
them less burdensome”). See also Dabba (2017).
5  The most important acts are: Regulations in Need of Scrutiny [REINS], https://www.gov-
track.us/congress/bills/115/s21/text (accessed August 8, 2017); the Regulatory Accountability 
Act [RAA] https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s951/text (accessed August 8, 2017), 
and the Regulatory Integrity Act [RIA], https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/1004 (accessed August 8, 2017). 
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The proposed statutes invoke science as a check on policymaking, not as a 
tool for crafting sensible policies that acknowledges the uncertainty of many re-
sults and the importance of acting to control risks even in the face of incomplete 
information. Cost/benefit analysis, mandated by some of the bills’ statutory lan-
guage, is taken as an unproblematic benchmark rather than as a useful but limited 
tool that relies on a number of contested premises familiar to all economists.6 
Combined with placing the burden of proof on regulatory agencies, the proposed 
statutes would reverse of the “precautionary principle”.
By mandating the model of a court case as the format for policymaking, the 
proposed amendments to the APA will predictably lead agencies to avoid rule-
making. Instead, if they continue to implement regulatory statutes, they will like-
ly proceed by case-by-case adjudication – a less transparent way to make policy 
and one that may be unclear and unpredictable as applied to forthcoming cases. If 
rulemakings do occur, the court-like procedures, with cross-examination, a high 
burden of proof on agencies, and an emphasis on cost/benefit analysis, will tend 
to favor wealthy interests, especially regulated industries. Thus, heavy business 
representation at agency hearings will continue, but will be harder to resist. The 
impact of well-financed groups may also strengthen if judicial review concen-
trates on the judicial character of the hearings with the burden of proof and per-
suasion on less well-financed and less well-lawyered civil society groups.
DEMOCRACY AND POLICYMAKING
I came to the Collegium Budapest project not only with an interest in the patholo-
gy of corruption but also with the view that an accountable public administration 
is a key source of democratic legitimacy. Corrupt officials lack public respect, 
but so too do honest officials who are secretive, non-transparent, incompetent, 
or wasteful. 
After the conclusion of the Collegium Budapest project, I published a study 
of Hungary and Poland in 2005, titled From Elections to Democracy. I argued 
that the transition had not gone far enough in reforming the bureaucracy and in-
troducing mechanisms of public accountability. Regime change did not go much 
beyond introducing the free market and the ballot box. My concerns about the 
fragility of efforts to establish competent, democratically legitimate governments 
that respects rights seem prescient today. However, fifteen years after our project 
6  In particular, there are long-running debates over the appropriate discount rate and over us-
ing money as an imperfect metric for utility. Potential global disasters raise special questions 
(Rose-Ackerman 2016).
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in Budapest, one cannot blame missteps during the transition for all current devel-
opments, especially because similar pressures on liberal, democratic values have 
arisen in Western Europe and in the United States. The problems are endemic to 
efforts to combine democracy with technocratic logic, not just during transitions. 
However, they are not insuperable.
Part of the problem is the limits of a theory that some take for reality. In an ide-
alized free market democracy, self-interest is compatible with the public interest. 
Everyone is a price taker in markets for inputs and outputs, and no one can skew 
public choices in his or her favor. Similarly, pure majoritarian democracy treats 
all citizens equally under the principle of one-person-one-vote. In practice, both 
the market and democracy are vulnerable to self-seeking behavior that leaves 
some citizens deeply disadvantaged and demoralized. These difficulties may be 
exacerbated in periods of transition because laws and norms are unclear and in 
flux. The project that Kornai and I organized focused on the way the transition 
itself affected honesty and trust in society. 
By the time of the transition, the socialist ideal had lost most of its norma-
tive force – undermined by a mismatch between the ideal and the reality of self-
seeking politicians and a dysfunctional economic system. However, in the United 
States, the economic transition to a post-industrial economy has created some of 
the same pressures on those left behind by the decline of heavy manufacturing 
and industrial labor unions. Nevertheless, the rapidity and depth of the change in 
Eastern Europe was particularly acute. However dysfunctional the status quo un-
der socialism, people had adapted to it and found ways to cope. The rapid change 
toward the market and democracy was disruptive. In a short span of time, the old 
rules and practical workarounds were no longer valid, and new ones were not yet 
in place or remained vague and under-enforced. Norms had not caught up with 
and adjusted to new rules. There were, at least, four fundamental problems in the 
transition from socialism: uncertain rules, poor program design, monopoly rents, 
and a deeply contested political space. At the time of our project, the prospect of 
European Union membership dominated the legislative agenda, creating its own 
problems. Those whom I interviewed described a “flood of legislation” that was 
often rapidly drafted and incapable of being well implemented, given the states’ 
lack of bureaucratic capacity and expertise (Rose-Ackerman 2005: 55–99).
The first and most obvious impact of the transition was great uncertainty about 
both the rules in place and their levels of enforcement. Under socialism, prices 
were not set to clear the market, so that scarcities and gluts developed. People 
waited in line for limited supplies of good quality meat and stylish shoes, but 
copies of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace were piled high in an East Berlin 
bookshop that I visited in the 1980s. Hence, the stage was set for corrupt under-
the-table payoffs to access scarce goods. Rules were sometimes so rigid that a 
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bribe was the only way to get things done. Corruption facilitated both activities 
that would be criminal anywhere and those that would be routine in a free mar-
ket. It helped to smooth over the rigidities of the planned economy (Montias – 
Rose-Ackerman 1981). After the transition, most old rules simply disappeared, 
leaving great uncertainty in their wake. If under socialism bribes were paid to 
get around rigid rules, now they were paid to buy some certainly because the 
system was in flux. But certainty was difficult to obtain. A corrupt official might 
come back for more payoffs, or another official might appear to demand a sec-
ond payoff. A vicious cycle could develop where existing levels of corruption 
encouraged more and more officials to demand payoffs, making it harder and 
harder for honest reformers to intervene to change expectations and establish a 
functioning rule of law.
Second, even when the state reformed public programs, the results were some-
times poorly designed and implemented. A particularly striking example is the 
healthcare system where the values of socialism persisted in formal programs that 
did not accord with the reality on the ground. Kornai was particularly concerned 
with that sector where the commitment to a universal, single-payer system clashed 
with the lack of public resources and led to widespread under-the-table payoffs 
to doctors, hospitals, and other medical personnel by those with the ability to pay 
(Kornai – Eggleston 2001, 2001a). In my experience, many people in Hungary 
refused to view their payments as bribes, yet they were, in fact, illegal, even if 
widely tolerated. The response to this mismatch of supply and demand should not 
have been a crackdown on individual payoffs, but rather an overhaul of the entire 
system that required hard choices about the level of public subsidy for the needy 
and the development of an overall system funded by some mixture of public and 
private insurance. Hungary, at least in 2002, could not have afforded Germany’s 
generous public healthcare system, but its policymakers seemed unable to make 
realistic tradeoffs to implement a workable policy.
Third, exacerbating the problems of vague or nonexistent rules and of dysfunc-
tional policies, individuals and businesses obtained monopoly positions in some 
industries and service sectors both inside the state and in the newly developing 
private sector. Some were insiders in the socialist regimes; others were outside 
business interests with deep pockets and few scruples. Political and economic 
power became deeply intertwined, fueled by a naïve belief or a cynical claim 
that the private market would spread prosperity to all and fuel economic growth. 
Some sectors did thrive, but most transition countries experienced a fall in overall 
income, slow growth, and increased poverty – a harsh reality that some transition 
states are only now moving beyond.
Fourth, the political space was and is deeply contested. In 2002, it was not 
unusual to hear opponents of Hungary’s newly elected social democratic govern-
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ment say that “the Communists are back in power”. Conversely, the social demo-
crats and liberals often characterized their right-of-center opponents as something 
close to fascists linked to the Arrow Cross. As the US is now experiencing under 
President Trump, a politics in which opponents are the “enemy” with no moral 
legitimacy is not a healthy democracy. 
CONCLUSIONS
Kornai’s disappointment in 2002 with developments in Eastern Europe is echoed 
today both by current weaknesses in that region and by efforts to make the United 
States government less open to input from civil society groups and individuals 
without extensive financial resources. On both sides of the Atlantic, Building a 
Trustworthy State and Creating Social Trust, the titles of our Collegium Budapest 
books, remain challenges for committed democrats seeking political-economic 
systems that are both fair and efficient. The key topics that Kornai identified to 
me in a 2000 e-mail remain salient: “[furthering] mutual trust and [overcom-
ing] distrust among society members; corruption; tax-evasion and other ways of 
cheating the state; the reputation of contracts and breach of contract, state capture 
by privileged groups or by criminals.”7
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